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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
PUBLIC COMMENT AS CONTEMPT OF COURT
BY JOSEPH J. CHUSED
The First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States
provides, among other things, that Congress shall make no law
abridging the freedom of speech or of the press. Those great
statesmen who led this country through its turbulent infancy
preached revolt against tyranny to the masses, and unqualifiedly
imbued this thought in their political masterpieces. The
privileges of free speech and of an untrammeled press, both re-
garded as essential to the very existence and perpetuity of self-
government, were zealously guarded.' The people of the states
have adopted similar provisions in their several constitutions,
theoretically creating a constitutional principle and placing it
upon a pedestal above all judicial reproach. 2 From this guaran-
tee has sprung up the closely related problem of the power of
courts to protect themselves and the administration of justice
from unwarranted abuse by newspapers and other agencies ap-
pealing to public sentiment. While the courts vigorously con-
demn the damaging force of "trial by newspaper," their very
echoes ring with a stirring counter-denunciation of the com-
bination in one person of complainant and tribunal.3 It is logi-
cal to conclude that when the constitutional guaranty of a free
press is gone, the guaranty of free speech will go with it. But
when newspapers do overstep the bounds of propriety in criti-
cizing the bench or in attempting unscrupulously to influence the
outcome of a pending case, such action should meet with a stern
rebuke from the same public mind which refuses to sanction
judicial tyranny.
It has been suggested that an honest and intelligent court will
12 COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIIiTATIoNS (8th ed. 1927) 876.
'Missouri has a typical constitutional provision. Article 2, section 14,
provides that no law shall be passed impairing the freedom of speech; that
every person shall be free to say, write or publish whatever he will on
every subject, being responsible for all abuse of that liberty; and that in
all prosecutions for libel, the truth itself may be given in evidence, and the
jury under the direction of the court, shall determine the law and the fact.
aIt has even been suggested that if brother judges were called in, the
objection would remain. Cornish v. U. S. (1924) 299 F. 283.
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win its way to public confidence in spite of adverse newspaper
remarks. While such a statement may not have warranted con-
scientious objection when made nearly a century ago,4 the
powerful appeal of the press today undoubtedly minimizes the
truth of such an assertion. But regardless of which attitude
we adopt on this question, there exists the modern doctrine that
courts have "inherent" power to punish summarily for certain
classes of "constructive" contempts.6 Several authors of note
have suggested that the claim by the courts of inherent power
to punish summarily for contempts by publication out of court
is founded upon a false view of the scope of summary judicial
power at common law.7 However, the doctrine not only remains
with us, but yearly fortifies itself with a greater chain of prece-
"Stuart v. People (1842) 4 Ill. 395.
' The jurisdiction of courts to punish for contempt because of printed
matter has long been said to be inherent. People v. Wilson (1872) 64 Ill.
195. Originally it is said to have been used only to punish insults to the
King or to his government. Beale, Contempt of Court, Criminal and Civil
(1908) 21 H~Av. L. REv. 161. The "inherent" idea of power to punish for
contempt is now unhesitatingly asserted in all jurisdictions. See U. S. v.
Craig (D. C. 1920) 266 F. 230; Michaelson v. U. S. (1924) 266 U. S. 42,
65; Dale v. State (1926) 198 Ind. 110, 150 N. E. 781. See also cases cited
and discussed later in this paper.
•Contempts may be broadly divided into two groups, designated as direct
and constructive. The ancient name for the latter was "consequential
contempt." Ex parte Duncan (1916) 78 Tex. Crim. 447, 182 S. W. 313.
The problem of direct contempt, which will be considered later for pur-
poses of comparison, is said to arise when there is an open insult committed
in the presence of the Court to the person of the presiding judge, or a re-
sistance or defiance in his presence to its powers or authority, or improper
conduct so near to the court as to interrupt its proceedings. Constructive
contempt is an act done, not in the presence of the court, but at a distance,
which tends to belittle, to degrade, or to obstruct, interrupt, prevent or em-
barrass the administration of justice. 13 C. J. 5.
In this treatment we are concerned with criminal rather than with civil
contempt. The distinction is well indicated in Anderson v. Indianapolis
Forging Co. (1904) 34 Ind. App. 100, 72 N. E. 277, 278. "Contempts of
Court for which punishment is inflicted for the primary purpose of vindi-
cating public authority are denominated criminal, while those in which en-
forcement of civil rights and remedies is the ultimate object of the punish-
ment are denominated civil contempts."
' Foremost among these critics is SIR JOHN C. Fox in his recent book,
THE HISTORY OF CONTEMPT OF COURT (1927). He believes that by the
actual ancient usage of the common law, "criminal contempt committed by
a stranger out of court was proceeded against like any other trespass in
the common law courts, with the assistance of a jury, unless the contempt
was confessed."
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dent, and denies even the power of the legislatures to obstruct
its reign. Those who advocate its eradication or modification
place their main reliance on the guaranties of freedom of the
press and of trial by jury. It has also been urged that such
punishment deprives of liberty or property without due proc-
ess of law.8
The case of Respublieca 'v. Oswald9 gave the State of Pennsyl-
vania the distinction of witnessing within its territory the first
American punishment for contempt by publication. Justice Mc-
Kean opined that the punishment must be summary lest the of-
fender persevere in his misconduct. He suggested that judges
would not be influenced by personal motives because "judges dis-
charge their functions under the solemn obligation of an oath,
and if their virtue entitles them to their station, they can neither
be corrupted by favor to swerve from, nor influence by fear to
desert from their duty." He concluded with the argument of
necessity, that "without this power no court could possibly ex-
ist." Such an opinion as to the virtues of a judge will meet with
a storm of opposition from many critics in other walks of life,
the more extreme of whom may yet regard the discretion of a
judge as the law of tyrants. But even the most broad minded
must agree that any human is apt occasionally to fall victim to
some of the follies and passions of human nature. Such a feel-
ing of resentment was given expression in 1809, one year after
the retirement of Chief Justice McKean, when the Pennsylvania
legislature enacted a measure which confined the summary
power within strict limitations: (1) official misconduct of court
officers; (2) disobedience of process; and (3) misbehavior in the
'Gitlow v. New York (1925) 268 U. S. 652.
' (1788) 1 Dall. 319. While the controversy over the ratification of the
federal Constitution waxed heatedly in that state, Eleazer Oswald, the edi-
tor of the Independent Gazetteer, was arrested for a libel of one Browne,
the master of a female academy. He published an article appealing to the
public, charging that the prosecution struck at the fundamental rights of
the press and of freemen, and was probably instituted as a result of his
opposition to the ratification, in which Browne was merely the handmaid
of some of his enemies among the federalists. "I may well suppose," wrote
Oswald, "the same love of liberty yet pervades my fellow citizens, and
that they will not allow the freedom of the press to be violated upon any
refined pretense which oppressive ingenuity or courtly study can invent."
Oswald was ordered to show cause why he should not be attached for
contempt.
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actual presence of the court, actually obstructing the administra-
tion of justice. Summary punishment for publication was ex-
pressly forbidden.-' The State of New York witnessed a similar
turmoil, and in 1829 passed statutes aiming at the elimination
of "constructive" contempts, which are still theoretically in
force."1
The growth of the Federal doctrine of constructive contempt
and its present influence on the policies of the states, present a
chain of colorful events. 12 Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of
1789 empowered the courts of the United States to punish by
fine or imprisonment "all contempts of authority in any cause or
hearing before the same." As early as 1812 the Supreme Court
suggested the doctrine of "inherent" contempt power, 3 but gave
no intimation that it might extend to publications. In 1821 the
case of Anderson v. Dunn"' sustained the inherent power of the
House of Representatives to punish for contempt by analogy to
that of the courts. In the words of Justice Johnson, "Courts
of justice are universally acknowledged to be vested, by their
very creation, with power to impose silence, respect, and de-
corum, in their presence, and submission to their lawful man-
dates, and as a corollary to this proposition, to preserve them-
selves and their officers from the approach and insults of pollu-
tion." But it remained for the famous Peck-Lawless case, 1826-
1831, to pave the way to the passage of a Federal statute which
exists inviolate on the statute books today, but whose force in at
least one respect has been completely nullified through construc-
tion of the act by the courts.
The early part of the last century saw Missouri in the con-
dition of a pioneer state, with its resulting frequent clashes over
speculative land claims. James H. Peck was appointed Federal
Judge for Missouri in 1822. Lawless, a lawyer representing
many claimants to land under French and Spanish grants but
" Pa. Acts 1808-09 c. 78 p. 146. The act still stands. It now appears
(with slight modifications) in Digest Pa. Stat. L. (1920) secs. 5484-5488.
'Judiciary Law, secs. 750, 753. Penal Law, sec. 600.
U A most illuminating article, Nelles and King, Contempt by Publication
in the United States, replete with detail, appears in (1928) 28 COL. L. REv.
401.
" U. S. v. Hudson (1812) 7 Cranch 32, with opinion by Mr. Justice
Johnson.
'6 Wheat. 204, 227.
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unconfirmed by this government, brought a test case known as
the Heirs of Antoine Soulard, which came on for trial before
Judge Peck in 1824 and 1825. The claim was for an enormous
tract of land which was alleged to have been conceded to Soulard
in 1796 in reward for his services as Surveyor General under the
Spanish Intendant. The concession was incomplete in the sense
that it had not been located or confirmed by the Lieutenant
Governor. It was explained that the documents attesting the
incomplete concession had been accidentally thrown into the
fire and destroyed. Judge Peck ruled that the concession had
not been legally made by the proper authorities, a view which,
if sustained, would prove fatal to the whole mass of unconfirmed
claims. After the publication of Judge Peck's opinion, Lawless
published in a rival paper a "concise statement of some of the
principal errors" of which Judge Peck had been guilty, "to
counteract the effect that his opinion was calculated to produce
on the value of the unconfirmed French and Spanish land titles,
and save the claimants from those speculators who would have
availed themselves of the panic which the opinion created, to
buy up those titles for an inadequate consideration." Judge
Peck held Lawless guilty of contempt and sentenced him to one
day's imprisonment and suspension from practice for eighteen
months.
Aroused by an inflamed public sentiment, the Senate brought
impeachment proceedings against Judge Peck in 1830-31, from
which he escaped an unmerited public disgrace by the narrow
margin of a single vote. In the same year of his acquittal, 1831,
there was passed "an act declaratory of the law concerning con-
tempts of court," apparently with the view to prevent any simi-
lar action on the part of a Federal judge.15 The text of the act
follows:
Be it enacted . . . that the power of the several courts of
the United States to issue attachments and inflict summary
punishments for contempt of court, shall not be construed
to extend to any cases except the misbehavior of any per-
son or persons in the presence of said courts, or so near
thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice,", the
Mar. 2, 1831 c. 98, 4 Stat. 487.
"' Italics are author's. The Federal interpretation of this clause will be
explained later.
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misbehavior of any of the officers of the said courts in their
official transactions, and the disobedience or resistance by
any officer of the said courts, party, juror, witness, or any
other person or persons, to any lawful writ, process, order,
rule, decree or command of the said courts.
Sec. 2. And be it further enacted, that if any person or
persons shall corruptly, or by threats or force, endeavor to
influence, intimidate, or impede any juror, witness, or offi-
cer, in any court of the United States, in the discharge of his
duty, or shall, corruptly, or by threats or force, obstruct or im-
pede or endeavor to obstruct or impede, the due administration
of justice therein, every person or persons, so offending, shall
be liable to prosecution therefor, by indictment, and shall,
on conviction thereof, be punished, by fine not exceeding five
hundred dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding three
months, or both, according to the nature and aggravation
of the offense.1 7
Judged in the light of the acts preceding their passage, the
Pennsylvania, New York, and Federal statutes all had the pri-
mary object of confining the summary power within bounds of
strict necessity. It was in this spirit, according to several cases
decided not long after the act, that the clause "so near thereto
(the presence of the court) as to obstruct the administration of
justice" was intended to be interpreted and applied. 18 But the
tide turned in 1915 in the famous case of U. S. v. Toledo News-
paper Co.,19 and modern judicial construction treats the "so
near" clause to include all misbehavior, however remote from the
presence of the court, which obstructs the administration of
justice.20 In the Toledo case there was pending a suit to enjoin
the enforcement of a city ordinance imposing drastic conditions
" This law is still on the books. The two sections have stood separate
since the Revised Statutes. Sec. 1 is now 28 U. S. C. sec. 385; and see.
2 is now 18 U. S. C. sec. 241.
Ex parte Poulson (1835) 19 Fed. Cas. No. 11,350, aff. Ex parte Robin-
son (1873) 19 Wall. 505, 510-11. These cases indicate that Federal drafts-
men intended the clause to mean only a disturbance directly tending to in-
terrupt proceedings.
" (1915) 220 F. 459; (1916) 237 F. 986; aff. (1918) 247 U. S. 402.
" It has been suggested that whether the test of jurisdiction is the physi-
cal proximity of the act to the court, or the tendency to affect the adminis-
tration of justice, under either view newspapers could be held accountable
by applying to contempts the law of constructive presence in criminal cases,
the misbehavior being considered to have been committed where it takes
effect. In re Independent Pub. Co. (1917) 240 F. 849.
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upon the continued use of the streets by the traction company
after the expiration of their franchises. The Toledo News-Bee
published articles and cartoons strongly intimating a bias on the
part of Judge Killits of the Northern District of Ohio in favor
of the traction interests. It was held, and affirmed on appeal,
that the criterion whether an alleged misbehavior is within the
"so near" clause is not the physical or topographical propinquity
of the act to the court; but, having reference to all the pertinent
circumstances attending its commission, it is the nature of the
act as tending directly to affect the administration of justice.
Several cases decided within the last year will be considered at
this point to show the present day application of this rule.
The case of Froelich v. U. S.21 reveals how jealously the Fed-
eral courts maintain the power unqualifiedly obtained for them
by the Toledo case. An indictment was returned against one
Frank W. Sommers and others in the District Court of the
United States for the District of Minnesota, Judge John B. San-
born presiding. Before trial of the case, Froelich wrote a let-
ter to the special assistant to the attorney-general in charge of
the case, calling attention to so-called reports that Judge San-
born was favorable to Sommers, and had approached grand
jurors in an endeavor to forestall the finding of an indictment,
concluding with the statement that it was all-important that
Judge Sanborn be not permitted to preside at the trial. There
was testimony that before mailing the letter, Froelich had ex-
hibited it to several residents of Saint Paul. It was held that
the acts of Froelich were punishable as contempt.22 In the words
of the Court, "the contention, long asserted, that only that is so
near to the presence of the court as to obstruct the administra-
tion of justice which from its physical proximity to the court,
disturbs and interferes with judicial proceedings, was finally
(1929) 33 F. (2d) 660.
Writing letters concerning a pending action to witnesses or others,
calculated to interfere with the administration of justice, has been held a
contempt in England. Welby v. Still (1892) 66 L. T. Rep. N. S. 523. Writ-
ing insulting letters to the judge has also been held punishable as contempt
in Federal courts. U. S. v. Huff (1913) 206 F. 700. In re Griffin (1888)
1 N. Y. S. 7, held contra, the state statute providing that contempt of court
shall consist of insolent behavior toward a court, committed during its
sitting, or publication of a false or grossly inaccurate report of its pro-
ceedings.
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disposed of by the Supreme Court in Toledo Newspaper Co. v.
U. S." So we have no alternative in Federal jurisdiction but to
accept the ultimatum that an act is judged to be contemptuous
not because of the place where it is committed, but because of its
character. If it tends to "obstruct and prevent the untram-
meled and unprejudiced exercise of the judicial power," it is
punishable contempt. 23 We cannot help but comment that such
an elastic rule is a dangerous instrumentality even in the hands
of the most level-headed public servant.
The case of U. S. v. Sullens24 reveals a factual situation dec-
orated throughout by political influences, too often the un-
fortunate cause of contempt proceedings. There were pending
in District Court in Mississippi several indictments for violation
of an act of Congress forbidding the sale of one's influence to
secure any appointive office under the United States. These
were commonly known as the Patronage Cases. After one ac-
quittal and before the next case was called for trial, the de-
fendant published an article which said substantially that poli-
tics was the sole issue that would be considered; that regardless
of the guilt or innocence of the defendants, they would be ac-
quitted because the jury would be composed exclusively of white
Democrats, who would be unwilling to convict, as such a result
" The reasoning of the court, revealing how the acts of the defendant had
a tendency to obstruct the administration of justice, is enlightening. The
opinion implies that the natural effect of the entire letter, if its contents
were believed by the recipient, was to induce him to file an affidavit of
prejudice. The obstruction follows from (1) the necessary rearrangement
of judicial machinery and possible delays incident to the filing of such an
affidavit; and (2) the fact that the recipient would be led to suspect, not
only the judge, but the jury and the officers of the court, and prevent a
rightly conducted trial.
The contention that the letter written by defendant was a privileged
communication failed to sway the court. "The law is that any citizen
having knowledge of a violation of the laws of the United States may and
is duty bound to communicate that knowledge to the government, and will
be protected in so doing. In re Quarles and Butler, Petitioners, 158 U. S.
532, 535." The acts of defendant, however, were denied the protection of
this privilege because (1) the letter was not a communication to any official
of the government having any duty to institute a prosecution for any of
the offenses suggested in the letter; and (2) the letter on its face showed
that it was not intended as a communication to the government made for
the purpose of bringing to justice offenders against the law, but that its
sole object was to affect a particular case pending in court.
(1929) 36 F. (2d) 230.
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would help to establish a Lily White Republican Party in
Mississippi, which was politically objectionable to the jury.
Although the court suspended sentence during good behavior,"
it used strong language in condemning the action of the editor.
"To buttonhole a juror and tell him that it was not altogether a
case of whether the defendants were guilty or innocent, but
whether the juror would be willing to encourage the establish-
ment of a white Republican party in Mississippi, would clearly
have been improper, and the defendant would not have thought
of doing it. To write that much and more under his own name
and print it on the front page of a large newspaper which cir-
culates in the vicinity of the trial, and which is sold at public
news stands and in the hotels of Meridian, was of equal, if not
greater, harmful tendeicy toward the prevention of an impartial
verdict, as the power of the printed page is stronger than the
spoken word.1
26
The spirit of the Federal Contempt Act of 1831 soon wended
its way into a majority of state statute books, and state legisla-
tion defining or limiting the summary power to punish for con-
structive contempt has continued to accumulate. But the nerve
was not removed from the doctrine which these statutes repudi-
ated, for again and again the old rule has burst up in a flame of
public excitement, with the tendency of the state courts con-
stantly growing to misconstrue or disregard any restrictions on
The suggestion of the need of some limitation, even though only a moral
one, on the use of the summary power, is phrased in this fashion: "In
short, this jurisdiction of punishing for contempt, being practically un-
limited and potentially arbitrary, should be most zealously guarded by the
courts and exercised by them with the greatest anxiety only in the most
extreme cases where there is no other pertinent remedy which can be found
in order to enable justice to be properly administered without pernicious
influence."
" The feelings of the defendant were expressed in a subsequent article
published while uther patronage cases were still pending:
"Concerning Contempt
"If everybody in Mississippi who expressed opinions to the effect that the
Federal government would not succeed in convicting the alleged patronage
grafters were sent to jail for contempt of court, it would cause a complete
suspension of business in the commonwealth.
"And if everybody who had expressed contempt and derision concerning
the hypocritical declaration of the Republican leaders that they intend to
make the party decent in Mississippi should be sent to jail, it would cost
about twenty million dollars to build enough jails to hold them."
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the summary power. Regardless of any guaranties of a free
press which newspapers may oratorically call to their defense, it
is plain that in this century they are not privileged to attempt
by their comments to intimidate the judges of a court and com-
pel them to submit to popular clamor the decision of a pending
case.2 1 Necessarily, this power which the courts exert for their
own preservation must be exercised with 'the greatest of pre-
caution. If it became the established policy that all courts are
above reproach, the sea of justice might become hemmed in by a
tide of dishonest judges and pitiful law enforcement. News-
paper editors could only mutter ominous threats to themselves,
but none would dare criticise a judge's rulings, no matter how
deserving of criticism. Political machinery, rather than judicial
knowledge and integrity, would prevail. Happily, such is not
the case, and the comparatively small number of contempt
prosecutions against publications in this age of public expres-
sion indicates an attitude on the part of our newspapers to stay
within reasonable bounds.
It would seem that after the final disposition of a case, the
press and the public have the right freely to discuss, criticise,
and censure the decisions of the courts, and this has been as-
serted by good authority to be the rule in this country.28 But at
common law the criticism of a judicial officer even after the
termination of a cause was often regarded as contempt.29 State
"The rule that publications as to a past proceeding cannot be punished
as contempts generally prevails in this country. In re Independent Pub.
Co. (1917) 240 F. 849; State v. District Court (1916) 52 Mont. 46, 155 Pac.
278; State v. Young (1910) 113 Minn.96, 129 N.W. 148; State v. Circuit Court
(1897) 97 Wis. 1, 72 N. W. 193; In re Shannon (1891) 11 Mont. 67, 27 Pac.
352; State v. Kaiser (1890) 20 Ore. 50, 23 Pac. 964; Cheadle v. State (1887)
110 Ind. 301, 11 N. E. 426. But a number of cases viciously attack such a
doctrine, and we will have occasion later to consider the conflict in some
detail.
" Patterson v. Colorado (1906) 205 U. S. 454.
"In the old English case of In re Read and Huggonson (1742) 2 Atkyns
469, where the punishment was for libeling a party to a pending cause,
Lord Hardwicke added that scandalizing the court itself and prejudicing
mankind against persons before the cause is heard, were also contempts.
"There cannot be anything of greater consequence than to keep the streams
of justice clear and pure." It was Lord Hardwicke's opinion, then, that
there are three different categories of contempt. It is also interesting to
note that he advanced as a reason for not remitting the contempt to the
criminal courts, his general power as Chancellor to find facts without a jury.
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v. Hildreth,30 a modern Vermont case, sets forth the common
law rule. The defendant objected by demurrer that as the case
was not pending when the article was published, but had been
finally determined, the court had no jurisdiction to proceed
against him for contempt. In overruling the objection the court
remarked that -many cases in this country support the defend-
ant's contention, but that most of them rest upon statutes which
expressly or impliedly undertake to limit the jurisdiction of
courts to punish for contempt, which statutes the courts follow
without questioning the power of the legislature to make them.
But since there was no such constitutional provision or statute
in Vermont, the court guided its decision by common law prin-
ciples. It rested its authority on several English decisions,"'
and on some of the more radical American cases which we shall
soon consider in detail.3 2 The common law rule can be nicely
illustrated by reference to two important Virginia cases. In
Comrnonwealth v. Dandridge,33 there was an attachment for
contempt in insulting a judge as he was entering the court house.
The insult related to what the judge had done the term before
in a case then tried and still pending. Respondent claimed the
attaching power could not be exercised for contempts touching
the past conduct of a judge. It was held, however, that as the
- (1909) 82 Vt. 382, 74 Atl. 71.
'Wilmot, C. J., in an undelivered opinion in The King v. Almon, 8 St.
Trials 54: "And I am sure it wants no great intuition to see that trials
by jury will be buried in the same grave with the authority of courts that
are to preside over them." McLeod v. St. Aubyn [1899] A. C. 549. The
Privy Council held that contempts of court could be committed by publish-
ing scandalous matter respecting the court after adjudication as well as
pending a case before it; but said that in England, committals for contempt
for scandalizing the court itself had become obsolete. But in the very next
year there arose the case of The Queen v. Gray [1900] 2 Q. B. 36, which
held that the publication in a newspaper of an article containing scurrilous
personal abuse of a judge with reference to his conduct as a judge in a
judicial proceeding that had terminated, was a contempt of court, punish-
able by the court on summary process. A note to that case says that in
England the court will still, when the circumstances demand its action, exer-
cise its jurisdiction to punish on summary process the contempt of "scan-
dalizing the court," though no contempt has been committed ex facie of the
court, nor in respect of a case pending.
' State v. Morrill (1855) 16 Ark. 384; State v. Shepherd (1903) 177 Mo.
205, 76 S. W. 79. Also cited by the court were the cases of In re Chadwick
(1896) 109 Mich. 588, 67 N. W. 1071; Commonwealth v. Dandridge (1824)
2 Va. Cas. 408; Burdett v. Commonwealth (1904) 103 Va. 838, 48 S. E. 878.
Supra note 32.
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authority and independence of the court might be equally as-
sailed either way, the distinction was merely ideal. This case is
referred to approvingly in Burdett v. Commonwealth. Twelve
indictments had been found against respondent, to all of which
he pleaded guilty and paid fines. He then caused to be published
in a newspaper an article signed by him in which he charged the
judge with acting toward him in a harsh and arbitrary manner
and actuated by vicious and corrupt motives. This was held a
contempt as at common law, as being of that kind which con-
sists of "scandalizing and defaming the court itself."
Those of us who profess a due regard for the spirit of free-
dom which pervades our system of government will undoubtedly
criticise the application of the common law doctrine in this coun-
try. Regardless of the character of the publication, and re-
gardless of what other liability it may bring upon its author, it
is difficult to conceive of how it will obstruct the administration
of justice in a case unless it is written and published while that
case is pending before a court. Liberty of the press should not
be sanctioned where it is used to invade the rights of others35 by
assailing litigants, intimidating witnesses, or spreading before
a jury opinions on the merits of a case before them, 6 for a
privilege should always be subject to recall where it appears to
have been abused. Consequently, it is a rule of almost universal
application in this country that publications concerning a pend-
ing cause, trial, or judicial investigation, constitute contempt
when calculated to prejudice or prevent fair and impartial
action. ' And the general rule is that the truth of the publica-
"Supra note 32.
" As in Tate v. State (1915) 132 Tenn. 131, 177 S. W. 69, where a news-
paper, disregarding an order of the court, published an article containing
information in regard to certain affidavits which had been declared inad-
missible in a suit pending at the time. Held, it was clearly within the
power of the court to punish such an offense as contempt.
N In re Shortridge (1893) 99 Cal. 526, 34 Pac. 227.
This is the rule as stated in the case of In re Cheeseman (1886) 49
N. J. L. 115, 6 Atl. 513.
In McDougall, Atty.-Gen., v. Sheridan (1913) 23 Idaho 191, 128 Pac. 954,
certain editorials and articles directly charged that the court corruptly
rendered the decision in a certain case then pending, and that it was ren-
dered by reason of a political trade, and not on the law and facts. Held,
such publications were a direct attack upon the court, as a court, and the
basis of a contempt proceeding.
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tion cannot be set up as a defense,38 nor will the plea of an edi-
torial mistake 39 or ignorance of the law4 0 ordinarily prevail. So
though we are dealing with an offense called criminal contempt,
it differs from the ordinary criminal offense not only in method
of punishment and lack of trial by jury, but also in that no
criminal intent is necessary for its commission.4 We must then
reach the rather general conclusion that the determination as to
whether a criminal contempt has been committed does not de-
pend on the intention of the offending party, but on the shady
criterion whether the act tends to obstruct the administration
of justice.42
While criticism of decided cases is not, under the prevailing
American view, a sufficient obstruction to be considered a con-
tempt, it is conceivable that certain factual situations may arise
which would make the application of this rule unwise. The re-
cent Indiana case of State v. Shumaker4 ' might be regarded as
being on the line, possibly depending on the view we take of
prohibition. The superintendent of the State Anti-Saloon
Patterson v. Colorado (1906) 205 U. S. 454; Hughes v. Territory (1906)
10 Ariz. 119, 85 Pac. 1058; Globe Newspaper Co. v. Commonwealth (1905)
188 Mass. 449, 74 N. E. 682.
' In the case of In re Providence Journal Co. (1907) 28 R. I. 489, 68 Atl.
428, it was held that an editorial misstatement of the law as stated in a
court's written opinion on a matter of wide application and importance is,
although unintentional, a contempt of court. In some states inaccurate
publication of a court's decision is, by statute, made a contempt of court.
People ex rel. Barnes v. Court of Sessions (1895) 147 N. Y. 290, 41 N. E.
700; State ex rel. Haskell v. Faulds (1895) 17 Mont. 140, 42 Pac. 285; In re
Robinson (1895) 117 N. C. 533, 23 S. E. 453.
'Seastream v. N. J. Exhibition Co. (1907) 71 N. J. Eq. 785, 65 Atl. 982.
In re Independent Pub. Co. (1915) 228 F. 787. But it has been held
that the absence of such intent may be considered in mitigation of the of-
fense. State v. Howell (1908) 80 Conn. 668, 69 Atl. 1057.
'" From Ex parte Nelson (1913) 251 Mo. 63, 157 S. W. 794, we take this
statement: "The authorities seem to be uniform in holding that where a
publication is unambiguous and clearly constitutes contempt, the intent is
conclusively presumed, that is, the publisher is conclusively presumed to
have meant what the publication clearly stated on its face." People v.
Wilson (1872) 64 Ill. 195, 212, 218, 220; In re Chadwick (1896) 109 Mich.
588, 604, 67 N. W. 1071; Telegram Newspaper Co. v. Commonwealth (1899)
172 Mass. 294, 52 N. E. 445; Sturoc's Case (1869) 48 N. H. 428; Fishback v.
State (1892) 131 Ind. 304, 314, 31 N. E. 86.
(1927) 157 N. E. 769.
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League caused his annual report to be published in pamphlet
form and distributed throughout the State. The report also ap-
peared in the official publication of the League. In the course of
his report, the superintendent asserted that substantial justice
had been defeated through the refusal of the State Supreme
Court to allow the admission of illegally obtained evidence in
several liquor cases which he named. He also called upon the
electors to return a dry supreme court at the next election, stat-
ing that at least one of the then sitting members was said to be
bitterly hostile to prohibition. The Attorney-General of the
State filed an information alleging that the superintendent was
guilty of an indirect contempt of court. It was held, in sub-
stance, that the defendant was guilty of contempt of court be-
cause the report in question was apt improperly to influence the
court on a principle of law that would certainly be involved in
future cases." But it is submitted that if every court presiding
at such a contempt proceeding were to take into consideration
similar cases that might arise in the future, then the defendant
might as well forego the trouble and formality of a trial.
The writer has already stated that a number of state courts
have disregarded the limitations placed by legislatures on their
powers to cite for contempt. Two cases in particular are of
sufficient importance to warrant a thorough analysis of the
opinions handed down therein. The earliest of these was an
Arkansas case, State v. Morrill,45 one of the first decisions to
hold a publication summarily punishable since the passage of the
Federal Contempt Act of 1831.4Y A newspaper had intimated
that the State Supreme Court had been bribed to admit an al-
leged murderer to bail. The publication was clearly not pun-
ishable if the plain meaning of the state statute were given ef-
" Prior to the decision in the Shumaker case, Indiana was apparently in
accord with the prevailing view. Cheadle v. State (1887) 110 Ind. 301,
11 N. E. 426; Zuver v. State (1919) 188 Ind. 60, 121 N. E. 828.
(1855) 16 Ark. 384.
Apparently the only preceding decision so holding was Tenney's Case
(1851) 23 N. H. 162, which rested on the authority of Blackstone, Lord
Hardwicke, Kent, and early Pennsylvania cases, ignoring all subsequent
doctrine and experience.
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fect.47 The Arkansas court stated that "the Legislature may
regulate the exercise of, but cannot abridge the express or neces-
sarily implied powers, granted to this court by the constitution.
If it could, it might encroach upon both the judicial and execu-
tive departments, draw to itself all the powers of government;
and thereby destroy that admirable system of checks and bal-
ances to be found in the organic framework of both the Federal
and State institutions, and a favorite theory in the governments
of the American people." Such terminology may well confuse
the most conscientious interpreter, for it may be argued that
the Arkansas statute did only regulate the exercise of the powers
of the courts, for it left all the common and ordinary contemp-
tuous offenses open to punishment. The court proceeded to as-
sert, in what was perhaps a sarcastic note, that the prohibitory
clause of the statute was entitled to great respect as an opinion
of the Legislature, but that it was certainly not binding. For
to say that it were "would be to concede that the courts have no
constitutional and inherent power to punish any class of con-
tempts, but that the whole subject is under the control of the
legislative department; because, if the General Assembly may
deprive the courts of power to punish one class of contempts, it
may go the whole length and divest them of power to punish any
contempt." 48
IThe statute on the subject of contempts declared that "Every court of
record shall have power to punish, as for criminal contempt, persons guilty
of the following acts, and no others: First. Disorderly, contemptuous, or
insolent behavior, committed during its sitting, in its immediate view and
presence, and directly tending to interrupt its proceedings, or to impair
the respect due to its authority. Second. Any breach of the peace, noise
or disturbance, directly tending to interrupt its proceedings. Third. Will-
ful disobedience of any process or order lawfully issued or made by it.
Fourth. Resistance willfully offered by any person to the lawful order or
process of the court. Fifth. The contumacious and unlawful refusal of
any person to be sworn as a witness, and when so sworn, the like refusal to
answer any legal and proper interrogatory." Digest c. 36 sec. 1, approved
Feb. 28, 1838.
' Chief Justice English, apparently exceedingly irked by the scandalous
charge of defendant, also took occasion to remark that if a judge were
really corrupt, impeachment proceedings might be brought against him
where he could meet his accuser face to face.
It is surprising to note that though both Judge English and Judge Peck(in the Peck-Lawless case) wished to uphold and enforce the sacred and
"inherent" power of the courts to punish for contempt, the Arkansas court
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No intense public clamor and hysteria for free speech and a
free press greeted the increasing attempts of state courts to
invalidate what they deemed a legislative interference with their
proper functions. Most of our courts now sustain the power
of a judge to punish for publications out of court reflecting upon
his judicial conduct, or deemed capable of influencing the de-
cision in a pending case, as "necessary" and "inherent." Such
power is admittedly inconsistent with constitutional guaranties
of "trial by jury as heretofore" unless it was well established at
common law when those guaranties were adopted. Following
the doctrine enunciated by Blackstone,49 it has generally been
assumed that the power was firmly entrenched by "immemorial
usage." We have seen how this doctrine, supposedly legislated
into extinction by the Federal Contempt Statute in 1831, was
unquestionably reestablished in the Federal courts by "construc-
tion" of that statute in the famous Toledo case. The same cycle
had previously occurred in the state courts, following chiefly the
rather daring precedent set by the case of State v. Morrill.
These courts, too, it must be remembered, set forth their atti-
tudes under the shadow of inconsistent statutes.
Remarkable as was the Morrill case, the first few years of the
present century were fated to witness an even more intense
controversy in the courts of Missouri. The case of State v.
Shepherd- was concerned with an article published by Shepherd
after an unsuccessful attempt of one Oglesby to secure damages
from the Missouri Pacific Railroad for the loss of a limb in an
accident, his case having gone to the Supreme Court three times.
According to the information filed by the Attorney-General, the
had this to say of the Federal decision: "But we may venture to remark
that independent of any statutory provisions upon the subject, the distinc-
tion between the constitutional freedom and licentious abuse of the press
is now so well understood in this country, that no American judge would
consider himself authorized to punish, as for contempt, authors of publica-
tions of the character of that made by Mr. Lawless."
"The reader will recall the recent critical attacks upon Blackstone's
theory. Sir John Fox's opinion was referred to in note 7, supra.
(1903) 177 Mo. 205, 76 S. W. 79. The Shepherd case has been said to
be of doubtful authority. See the dissenting opinion of Judge Martin in
State v. Shumaker (Ind. 1927) 157 N. E. 769. Its decision was the reason
for the writing in 1904 of the textbook, THE LAW OF CONSTRUCTIVE CON-
TEMPT, by JOHN L. THOMAS, an ex-judge of the Missouri Supreme Court,
wherein he pointed out what he conceived to be the errors of that case.
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defendant's article (1) charged the Attorney-General and the
Governor with faithlessness in the discharge of their duties; (2)
charged the legislative department with high and grave misde-
meanors; (3) charged the Supreme Court with having "sold its
soul to the corporations"; and (4) charged the Democratic nomi-
nating convention of 1902 with having been dominated by the
railroads. A reading of the case substantiates this description
of the tenor of defendant's publication. The next step in the
factual situation may be garnered from these condemning words
of the court: "Instead of making the amende honorable by
withdrawing the charges and apologizing like a man, he (de-
fendant) seeks to escape punishment by challenging the juris-
diction of this court to protect itself from insult and to main-
tain the respect and dignity with which the people have invested
it, denies the facts charged are sufficient to constitute a con-
tempt, and raises other technical and constitutional questions."
The Missouri statute 1-which was invoked by the defendant as
limiting the court's power to punish for contempt, was worded
exactly as was the Arkansas statute in the Morrill case. 2 The
Missouri court stated its reason for disregarding the statute in
these words: "The law is well settled, both in England and
America, that the Legislature has no power to take away,
abridge, impair, limit, or regulate the power of courts of record
to punish for contempts." It will be noted that this statement
carried the doctrine of the Morrill case even a step farther, for
the Arkansas court had been kind enough to leave at least the
power of regulation in the hands of the Legislature." As for the
right of trial by jury in contempt cases, the Missouri court un-
falteringly declared that such privilege never existed at common,
law, and was wholly unknown to the laws of Missouri at the
time of the adoption of the Constitution of 1820, and those of
1865 and 1875. If we adopt this statement as indicative of the
law, the conclusion necessarily follows that the guarantee of the
'R. S. Mo. (1899) sec. 1616.
' See note 47, supra.
'The Missouri court further took occasion to remark that in only the
states of Georgia and Louisiana is power given by the constitution of the
state to the legislature to limit the power of the court to punish for con-
tempt, and that in all the other states the better opinion is that where the
court is a creature of the constitution, the inherent power to punish con-
tempt cannot be shorn, abridged, limited or regulated. 177 Mv. 205, 236.
Washington University Open Scholarship
COMMENT AS CONTEMPT OF COURT
Constitution of 1875, that "the right of trial by jury, as hereto-
fore enjoyed, shall remain inviolate," was not intended to confer
such a right in contempt cases, for such a right had never been
"heretofore enjoyed" in this state.
Recent decisions by state courts reveal an increasing tendency
to override all legislative restrictions on the contempt power.
The case of In re Simmons,-4 decided last year in Michigan,
brings several new factors into the situation. The trial of cer-
tain men who were charged with the crime of extortion was in
progress in the recorder's court in the city of Detroit. The case
was notorious. One Jacoby testified that he collected money
from persons in the cleaning and dyeing business under the di-
rection of Frank X. Martel, president of the Detroit Federation
of Labor, and had paid the money to him. Defendant Simmons
was secretary of the Federation, and Martel's attorney. A re-
porter of the Detroit Free Press asked the defendant if he might
quote his statements to the effect that Martel had never received
any money from Jacoby, and defendant consented. The next
day the Press contained an article headed "SIMMONS DENIES
GRAFT," and "JACOBY DISPOSED OF MONEY." The case was still
pending and testimony not yet closed. Simmons was found
guilty of contempt. 5  He contended that the court had no juris-
diction because the acts charged as contempt were not "within
the immediate view and presence of the court and directly tend-
ing to interrupt its proceedings or to impair the respect due to
its authority," as required by statute.,6 The Michigan court
not only upheld the imperialistic doctrine of the Morrill and
Shepherd cases, ruling that criminal contempt statutes were not
designed to limit or prohibit jurisdiction, but held further
that such statutes were in affirmation of the common law in-
herent power of courts of record to punish for all contempts.
It is difficult to criticise the practical result of the case, since at
"(1929) 226 N. W. 907.
"During the Jacoby trial, Simmons presented to the trial judge at cham-
bers a written document, severely criticizing the conduct of the case. This
fact was cited by the court in aid of its conclusion that defendant's state-
ment was deliberately intended to embarrass the court and jury and bring
the trial into public disrepute, in furtherance of a general scheme to that
end.
" 3 Comp. Laws (1915) sec. 12,268, defining contempts punishable by
courts of record.
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least the theory of our system of trial is that the conclusions to
be reached in a case will be induced only by evidence and argu-
ment in open court, and not by any outside influence, whether
of private talk or public print'7 The Simmons case also brings
up the question of who may be responsible for a publication.
Under that decision, a party need not have requested the publica-
tion or even have given his express consent, but if the state-
ment is indicated for publication, with the intention that it will
be written and published, and the purpose in that respect is car-
ried out, the party who makes it with such intent and under-
standing is equally guilty as if an express request for publica-
tion had been made. This same rule of responsibility has been
approved in cases involving criminal libel,5 8 and has been as-
serted to be the prevailing rule in this country in such proceed-
ings.59 Another section of the Michigan statute required in all
cases of misconduct not committed in the immediate view and
presence of the court, that the court before proceeding "shall be
satisfied by due proof by affidavit of the facts charged."'6 Such
provisions are justified on the ground that the public is entitled
to the protection afforded by the penalties imposed for false
swearing."' Objection that the facts are set forth in the form
of a verified petition rather than in the form of an affidavit has
been held to be technical and without substance . 2 The rule that
Patterson v. Colorado (1906) 205 U. S. 454.
Clay v. People (1877) 86 Ill. 147; State v. Osborn (1894) 54 Kan. 473,
38 Pac. 572.
'17 R. C. L. 386.
3 Cuomp. Laws (1915) sec. 12,270.
'Necessity of Affidavit or Sworn Statement as Foundation for Con-
structive Contempt (1919) 2 A. L. R. 226.
4 Campbell v. Jeffries (1928) 244 Mich. 165, 221 N. W. 138. There was.
pending in the recorder's court of Detroit a cause known as Owen Memorial
Park Link condemnation case. There appeared in the Detroit Evening
News a purported interview by defendant respecting the case, stating that,
"Mr. Campbell declared the figures set by the city outrageous and fabulous.
... This case smells to heaven .... The manner in which the case was
rushed through court by the outgoing administration is hardly under-
standable." The verified petition set forth the interview of Mr. Campbell
as published. Campbell was found guilty of contempt and sentenced to
jail. "Neither refinement nor discussion is necessary to demonstrate that
the interview published is contemptuous. It is so on its face. The lan-
guage tends to degrade the court and to embarrass the administration of
justice. It charges the court with participation in conduct so vile and so
corrupt that it 'smells to heaven'."
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there can be no statutory limitation on the power of the judiciary
to define contempts without express constitutional authority is
also well established in Georgia.e3
The recent Indiana case of State v. Shumaker, already refer-
red to, is interesting not only because it punishes as contempt a
criticism of a decided case, but also for the broad-minded and
scholarly dissent of Judges Gemmill and Martin. The majority
opinion expresses a rather belligerent attitude toward the per-
petrators of acts calculated to arouse public prejudice against
the judges in the performance of their judicial functions, and
suggests that for the court to pass unnoticed such conduct would
be "so cowardly that it would be contemptible and a disgrace."
In a rather apparent attempt to defend itself for reelection
against a bitter attack of the Anti-Saloon League, the court en-
deavors to justify its decisions in certain liquor cases on the very
questionable ground that, "The trend and weight of public opin-
ion and sentiment on questions of importance is subject to
change; but sound legal principles founded on reason and justice
should never change." The dissenting opinion admits that the
defendant may have made some misstatements as to just what
certain cases had held, but suggests that anyone not trained in
the law is apt to make such mistakes in discussing technical
legal questions. If we adopt this view of the facts (and it cer-
- Cf. note 51, supra. Bradley v. State (1900) 111 Ga. 168, 36 S. E. 630,
held that the provision of the Georgia Constitution which declares that
"The power of the courts to punish for contempts shall be limited by legis-
lative acts," gives to the legislature only the power to prescribe the pun-
ishment, after conviction. A recent case showing the present rule in
Georgia is Jones v. State (1928) 39 Ga. App. 1, 145 S. E. 914. A petition
for injunction prayed that the judge declare himself disqualified from
passing upon the questions presented, for the alleged reason that he had
deprived the petitioner of her constitutional rights by passing upon "various
and sundry petitions and bills" after holding secret conferences with op-
posing counsel, and without giving her a chance to be heard, and averred
that "with regret and humiliation she is compelled to assert to this court
that she can not get a fair, impartial, and legal hearing," and prayed that
the judge "will conscientiously and honestly consider" the question of his
disqualification. The presentation of such petition was adjudged in con-
tempt of court on the broad ground that all constitutional courts have the
inherent power to define and punish contempts. The case denies the
power of the legislature, without express constitutional authority, to define
what are contempts and declare that the court shall have jurisdiction over
no acts except those specified, citing Bradley v. State, supra.
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tainly seems the more logical one since the defendant Shumaker
was a minister), then it appears that the defendant's criticism
was directed toward the judgment or reasoning of the court and
not against the integrity or honesty of the court, or of its mem-
bers. The action of contempt of court is an extraordinary one in
our system of jurisprudence and should be invoked only when
the offending act unquestionably impedes or disturbs the admin-
istration of justice. 4 "Supreme Courts are neither honored or
helped by being held up as above criticism," stated the dissenting
opinion. "Constructive criticism of judicial decisions, whether
it be professional or lay, is to be desired rather than to be
stifled. The time when men, whether kings or judges, could be
considered incapable of doing wrong, is buried in the historic
past." The unfortunate situation of the judge whose decisions
are criticised sitting in judgment of the person who has made
the criticism has many times been sharply condemned. How-
ever, there now exists small possibility of the jury becoming a
necessity in proceedings for contempt, although that suggestion
was often made in former years with great vigor. 5
It has already been stated that newspaper publications, when
considered as contempts of court, are usually classed as indirect
or constructive contempts.66 In a few cases, however, they have
actually been designated as direct contempts, 7 and there are a
number of cases in which they have been considered as some-
"Francis v. People (1926) 11 F. (2d) 860, 865. See also 6 R. C. L. 512,
sec. 25.
'In Storey v. People (1875) 79 Ill. 45, the court, quoting from Stuart
v. People (1842) 4 Ill. 395, 406, said: "If a judge be libeled by the public
press, he and his assailant should be placed on equal grounds, and their
common arbiter should be a jury of the country."
"Further cases applying this general rule are: Kilgallen v. State (1922)
192 Ind. 531, 132 N. E. 682, 137 N. E. 178; Ray v. State (1917) 186 Ind.
396, 114 N. E. 866; Herald-Republican Pub. Co. v. Lewis (1913) 42 Utah
188, 129 Pac. 624; State v. Bee Pub. Co. (1900) 60 Neb. 282, 83 N. W. 204;
Cooper v. People (1881) 13 Colo. 337, 22 Pac. 790; State v. Frew (1884)
24 W. Va. 416.
'In Dale v. State (1926) 198 Ind. 110, 150 N. E. 781, the defendant was
found guilty of contempt for a newspaper article attacking the jury com-
missioners, the grand jury which returned a certain indictment, other offi-
cers of the court, and the presiding judge, and it seems to be held that this
was a direct contempt.
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what analogous to direct contempts . On first thought one
might desire to criticise severely such action as carrying doubtful
powers of the court to an unwarranted extreme, but on con-
sideration we must realize that such discrimination is for the
most part a matter of terminology. But where the court takes
the liberty of stretching the meaning of a direct contempt statute
beyond all reasoiable bounds, or endeavors to condemn a party
charged with constructive contempt without a hearing, such
action should meet with frank disapproval and condemnation. 9
Under the view which the courts have arbitrarily adopted, the
power to punish is the same in cases of direct or constructive
contempt. The difference is only one of procedure. In cases of
direct contempts, the court acts spontaneously, and commits the
offender summarily. In cases of constructive contempts, the
court, upon information, issues a citation to the offender to
show cause why he should not be punished for contempt. Some
offenses seem to contain characteristics of both direct and con-
structive contempts, as in a case where the defendants sur-
reptitiously photographed the prisoner on trial in violation of
the order of court and published the photographs in their news-
paper.,: But it is the substance of this power assumed by the
judiciary which should bear the brunt of our criticism, rather
than the technical name given the offense by the courts.
The distinction between criminal contempt and other criminal
offenses is forcefully enunciated in those cases dealing with the
question of when the pardoning power may be exerted. The
doctrine of separation of powers has frequently been invoked
to prevent the executive's pardoning power from extending to
cases where the judicial organ of the state has punished for
criminal contempt. In the Shumaker case the Indiana court de-
"In a number of cases, publications have been considered as done in the
presence of the court. Stuart v. People (1842) 4 Ill. 395; People v. Wl-
son (1872) 64 Ill. 195; Telegram Newspaper Co. v. Commonwealth (1899)
172 Mass. 294, 52 N. E. 445; Territory v. Murray (1887) 7 Mont. 251, 15
Pac. 145; Field v. Thornell (1898) 106 Iowa 7, 75 N. W. 685.
" In Ex parte Nelson (1913) 251 Mo. 63, 157 S. W. 794, it was held that
an attempt on the part of the lower court to so condemn resulted in denying
defendant due process of law-a hearing according to the law of the land-
and defendant was discharged on habeas corpus.
" Ex parte Sturm (1927) 152 Md. 114, 136 Atl. 312.
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nied the power of the Governor to pardon the defendant after
conviction. 71 It declared that the structure of the government
of the state of Indiana is based upon the doctrine of the separa-
tion of powers whereby the political state is divided into three
branches, each of which may not be controlled or embarrassed
by another. From this position, the argument is advanced that
a criminal contempt is an affront to the judiciary which has in-
herent power to punish, unhampered by the pardoning power of
the executive.72 It has even been asserted that such pardoning
power in the executive would result in the subservience of the
judiciary to the executive and a total destruction of its inde-
pendence.7- But is not abuse of the pardoning power just as
likely to occur in any division of the criminal field? If such a
view were consistently adopted, we might as well abolish the
pardon. The court can convict the defendant of the contempt,
just as it can convict one guilty of another criminal offense, and
so maintain its respect and dignity. Nor is there actually a total
division of the powers of government, but a strange combination
for some purposes and a division for others. Cooperation and
separation are equally necessary. Further, contempt is not a
sacred offense which can be committed only against the judi-
ciary, but it may be committed against legislative bodies, who
are generally held to have inherent power to punish.4 When the
Supreme Court of the United States was confronted in 1925 with
'After Shumaker was adjudged in contempt of court, fined, and im-
prisoned, the governor granted him a pardon. On an information by the
sheriff, a peremptory writ was issued out of court to the 'defendant to show
cause why judgment should not be executed notwithstanding the governor's
pardon. The defendant's demurrer was overruled, and the jail sentence
reinstated.
"The Indiana court followed the view of Taylor v. Goodrich (1897) 25
Tex. Civ. App. 109, 40 S. W. 515. But the Texas decision was based largely
on the fact that criminal contempt was not included in the criminal code of
the state, and, therefore, could not come under the term "crimes" in the
pardon clause of the state constitution.
Taylor v. Goodrich, note 72, supra.
McGrain v. Daugherty (1927) 273 U. S. 135. The defendant was held
guilty of contempt when he refused to testify before a committee of the
Senate which was seeking information as a basis for law making. For a
thorough review and discussion of authorities, see Landis, Constitutional
Limitations on the Congressional Power of Investigation (1927) 40 IARV. L.
REV. 153.
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the question whether the President had power to pardon in case
of criminal contempt, Mr. Chief Justice Taft held that the
President had that power.75 The opinion likened our executive
pardoning power to the King's prerogative,71 and also pointed
out that the separation of powers doctrine could not be used
as a fixed concept.
The writer has briefly traced the development of our present
Federal and state doctrines governing actions for contempt
against those making improper public comment to the detriment
of the judiciary and judicial proceedings. The right to punish
for constructive contempts by publication was assumed by the
state courts to be one of their inherent powers in the early years
of this country's development. State statutes passed to elim-
inate this attitude of independence proved fruitless when their
application was attempted a few years subsequent. The Federal
Contempt Statute, enacted to remedy the evil made apparent by
the Peck-Lawless case, has been so broadly interpreted that it
has served only to emphasize the autocratic dominion of the
judiciary. State statutes following in the wake of the Federal
enactment met with even greater abuse, and soon proved of no
avail as a restrictive force. Even the requirement that the
criticism be of a pending case to be contemptuous is gradually
being brushed away, the courts tending to disregard all limita-
tions placed on their jurisdiction over contempts by the legis-
lature. The power to punish for acts committed spatially dis-
tant from the court, a power of doubtful origin, has been slowly
extended by practically all American courts in rather arbitrary
fashion. The appellate courts are extremely hesitant to deny
the righteousness of a lower court's citation for contempt, gen-
erally advancing the reason that they are not in as favorable a
position to judge the contemptuousness of the offense, and thus
do their bit to uphold the dignity and austerity of the judiciary.
Though some decisions of late indicate a tendency to recognize
the wise limitations of physical proximity of the act to the court
" Ex parte Grossman (1925) 267 U. S. 87.
" In England, since the judicial power of the state is representative of
the sovereign, and since there is no constitutional division of powers, a
criminal contempt is an offense against the sovereign, which he may par-
don in his discretion.
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and the pendency of a trial, such tendency is offset by a grim de-
termination apparent in other cases that the judiciary shall not
be subjugated to the desires of any public agency or influence.
Two conflicting forces, each affected with a public interest, must
be given careful consideration. If the public may override the
courts and sap their strength to the degree that their inde-
pendence no longer obtains, then the institution of legitimate
trial will grdaually wither away. But if the courts may so arbi-
trarily hold themselves aloof from reproach that the popular
conception of justice is not at all considered, then democracy
must merge into autocracy. Of the two, this is the graver danger.
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